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  Canada (1929), Canada (1951), Canada (1982). A listing of other reports and studies can be found in1
Dorland, (1996).
  Professors Steven Globerman, Colin Hoskins and Stuart McFadyen have critically applied economic2
analysis to the policies.
1
Introduction
For the past seventy years, Canada’s cultural industries have been the object of official inquiries and
private studies. The Aird Commission of 1929 examined Canada’s radio broadcasting needs leading to
the passage of the first Broadcasting Act in 1932, and the establishment of the publicly owned
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in 1936. A major inquiry, the Royal Commission on National
Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences  reported in 1951, followed some years later by The
Report of the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee in 1982. In addition, there have been
numerous federal and provincial inquiries into broadcasting, cable and satellite television services, book,
newspaper and periodical publishing, film and sound recording production and distribution.1
The outcome of these reports and other political influences has been an array of government policies
aimed at promoting Canada’s cultural industries through public ownership, restrictions on foreign
ownership, tax and tariff measures, subsidies, copyright laws, Canadian content (Cancon) rules as well
as policies regarding pornography, language, violence and hate. At the same time, Canada has made a
series of commitments in international agreements affecting trade in cultural goods and services,
investment, spectrum use, and intellectual property rights. 
The domestic policies have been protectionist in the sense that they have sought to promote the
production of Canadian material and its distribution through Canadian owned and controlled channels.
Some have pursued these goals directly through government production or subsidies. Others have
restricted the inflow of foreign material. Although Canadians have had access to a wide assortment of
foreign books, magazines, newspapers, films, sound recordings and broadcast signals, the policies have
either made this access more costly or limited it by imposing quotas or prohibitions. The overall
rationale for the policies has been that without them Canadian voices would not be heard. Canadians
would not be able to communicate to each other and that this would be detrimental to national unity and
identity. The policy debate is littered with statements such as “...if Canada stops supporting its culture, it
will be endangering its survival as an independent nation (Henighan, 1996 p.3).”
While exceptions exist,  the application of economic analysis to this area of policy has generally not2
been welcomed in political circles. The line of criticism which is acceptable in the official political
discourse is that any deficiencies arise from inadequate funding of the current policies and from the
adverse effect of American influences on the Canadian cultural industries. All political parties have been
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   Minister Eggleton made his remarks in a speech at Osgoode hall Law School, York University, Toronto,3
January 27, 1997. Minister Marchi’s remarks were published in the Globe and Mail, December 17, 1997. Bill Roberts,
Secretary-General of the North American National Broadcasters Association, has noted the lack of a consistent
policy approach by the Canadian government. His remarks appeared in conference materials for the Insight
Conference, Broadcast Summit on the New Specialty Channels, September 26-27, 1996, Metro Toronto Convention
Center.
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supportive of current policy. Only recently, have cracks in this political solidarity appeared and the
public debate become more open. Muted dissent or at least a willingness to debate the thrust of policy
has surfaced within the government. While the Department of Canadian Heritage and the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) have not broken ranks, two federal
Ministers of International Trade have questioned the desirability of the policies, the Hon. Arthur
Eggleton in January 1997 and the Hon. Sergio Marchi in December 1997. Industry Canada has also
shown a willingness to reexamine existing approaches.3
In this paper, we examine the factors which are bringing about the change in thinking on Canada’s
approach to supporting the cultural industries. In our view, there are three factors at work. First,
technology is altering the way in which cultural content is produced and distributed. The advent of
satellite broadcasting, the Internet (web TV and radio), videos and digital video discs (DVD), have
increased the political and economic costs of a democratic government enforcing controls on what
consumers watch or listen. Canadian content rules become increasingly ineffective if audiences can turn
to unregulated sources of content.
Second, interesting stories, images and good music have always traveled well. The recent spate of
technological developments in communication reinforce the importance of international markets by
reducing the costs of existing international distribution systems and introducing new ones. This extension
of the market for cultural products allows producers from small countries to support development and
marketing budgets comparable to those available to their counterparts from large countries.
While the preference of a Canadian producer may be for a protected domestic and an open foreign
market, this is not a viable strategy in international trade negotiations. The efforts of the Canadian
government to maintain access abroad for Canadian cultural products while restricting access to
foreigners at home is reflected in its widely publicized resolve to keep “culture off the table” in the
Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and now the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI). In reality, the emerging commercial interests of segments of the Canadian cultural
industries, particularly television and film production, are such that they would lose more from having
their existing access to foreign markets restricted than from some relaxation of domestic protection.
Canada has made significant but unpublicized commitments in the international agreements in particular
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 Few would quarrel with the following description:4
“Culture, however we define it, is central to everything we do and think. It is what we do and the reason
why we do it, what we wish and why we imagine it, what we perceive and how we express it, how we live
and in what manner we approach death. It is our environment and the patterns of our adaptation to it. It is
the world we have created and are still creating; it is the way we see that world and the motives that urge us
to change it. It is the way we know ourselves and each other; it is our web of personal relationships, it is the
images and abstractions that allow us to live together in communities and nations. It is the element in which
we live.” Bernard Ostry Address to CTPL Conference, Carleton University, October 9, 1997. 
The connection between this objective and existing policies is less clear and open to debate.
3
with respect to international trade in goods. The expectation was that much of the protection given to
domestic producers and distributors could be maintained  through continuing to control investment and
service transactions. As a result of a series of disputes, which have either more precisely defined the
current international regimes or, in the case of disputes settled outside these regimes, revealed the
growing importance of the area in American and European diplomacy, this belief has been brought into
question.
Third, questions are now being raised about whether the protectionist polices have delivered on their
stated aims. Canadian cultural policy is based on the premise that the government can shape “new and
better” Canadians by altering the menu of cultural products. In practice, that objective has been
confounded with industrial policy goals. At each level, some gnawing doubts are emerging from
Canadian experiences. There is general agreement about the importance of culture but there is doubt
about whether cultures are better nurtured from the top or, in a higgledy-piggledy fashion, from below.4
After experiencing a half century of cultural industry policies designed, at least in part, to foster
Canadian national culture and unity, Canada is arguably closer to separating than it has ever been. The
actual policies have encouraged not a change in content menu but resulted in a substitution of Canadian
production of “international” or  “American” type content for foreign production. At the industrial level,
there are also questions about the viability and creativity of industries hothoused into existence by
subsidies. In the European Union (EU), for example, there is growing support for the view that the
subsidy regime for film and television production has been responsible for the weakness of the film
industries in member countries. Similar concerns are emerging in Canada. 
In the remainder of the paper, we examine the interaction of these three factors in defining the changing
international environment in which domestic cultural policies operate and indicate the way in which
those domestic policies are being relaxed and revised in response.
Existing policies and international obligations
Under the CUSFTA, Article 2005(1) exempts the cultural industries from the obligations of the
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 Some of the cases are discussed in greater detail in Acheson and Maule (1996a, 1997).5
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agreement, but makes certain commitments including the removal of tariffs on cultural products and the
assurance that American owners forced to divest assets in Canada because of ownership restrictions in
the cultural industries will receive fair market value for those assets. Article 2005(2) permits either
country to “take measures of equivalent effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent
with this Agreement but for paragraph 1.” This ambiguous pair of articles was carried over into the
NAFTA with respect to Canada’s obligations with the United States and Mexico. The last two
countries took no such exemption in their relationship with each other. At the time the CUSFTA was
signed there were differing interpretations of the circumstances under which retaliation could occur.
Subsequent disputes have not resolved these differences because neither the United States nor Canada
has chosen to use the NAFTA dispute resolution process for cultural trade disputes between the two
countries.
In the WTO, member countries are able to exempt their cultural industries from the obligations of the
agreement as long as they are considered to involve trade in services and fall under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and not trade in goods subject to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Canada did not make any commitments for its cultural industries under the
GATS and took a most-favored-nation (MFN) exemption for its film and television coproduction
treaties.
The NAFTA and the WTO also have obligations regarding investment. The NAFTA exemption means
that Canada has undertaken no commitments regarding the cultural industries but is committed to the
WTO provisions of the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) as they may affect investment in
the cultural industries. Currently, negotiations are taking place among 29 OECD countries for a MAI
which would bind countries to non-discriminatory treatment for foreign investment requiring adherence
to national treatment and MFN principles. As we discuss below, proposals have been put forward to
exempt the cultural industries from the provisions of this agreement.
That Canada was to a significant degree not able to protect its protectionist policies from international
response is apparent from a series of international disputes that have arisen.  To illustrate the5
complicated dynamics of these interactions, we will draw brief lessons from the disputes. 
One case concerned the removal by the CRTC of Country Music Television (CMT) from a list of
American services ruled to be eligible for carriage by Canadian cable companies and its replacement by
a new Canadian service providing a like country music service. As we have provided a detailed
account of this dispute elsewhere, we emphasize here the background to this decision and the features
that reflect evolving international and domestic policy (Acheson and Maule, 1997). 
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With respect to the antecedents, we note that Canadians demand a sophisticated menu of television
viewing options and use what is available elsewhere, particularly from the United States, as benchmarks
from which to judge their options. This constraint on Canadian television policy, which again is seldom
mentioned in the public debate, but is clearly understood by the policy makers, translates into allowing
some access by American broadcasting services to Canadian cable companies. None of the political
parties which are unanimous in decrying the corrupting influence of American programming and in
creating “shelf space” for Canadian content, as well as subsidizing its production, advocates stemming
the inflow of American television shows to the extent allowable under current international obligations.  
When cable services were first developing in cities like Toronto, in which households could receive
American television channels over-the-air, the decision to allow the cable companies to retransmit these
American channels was a policy decision. The Canadian authorities could not legally prevent the over-
the-air reception of Buffalo stations but it could prevent their retransmission on cable. Under indirect
pressure from viewers and direct pressure from Canadian cable companies retransmission was allowed.
The CRTC then were criticized by residents of cities like Calgary who could not receive American
signals over the air and whose cable companies were not allowed to transport the signals to their
headends. In response, the CRTC initiated its 3 + 1 policy which allowed all Canadian cable
companies to carry and have transported to their headends NBC, CBS, ABC and the American public
network, PBS. 
Subsequently, specialized cable channels, which were not available over-the-air and were delivered to
cable systems by satellite, developed and prospered in the United States and with an imitative lag, in
Canada. In 1983, Canada licensed both a music-video and a sports specialty channel, but the breadth
of Canadian offerings was narrow compared to the United States. The CRTC allowed the cable
companies to add American cable channels to their basic and discretionary tiers to flesh out a package
which could be marketed to subscribers. Control was exerted by limiting the cable companies from a
list of approved American channels and requiring them to link the number of American offerings to the
number of Canadian channels in a prescribed ratio. Since American channels cannot be licensed in
Canada because of ownership restrictions, the CRTC implemented its policy by distinguishing between
licensing, which is necessary for all Canadian broadcasters, and declaring a channel eligible for carriage
on cable. CRTC policy towards the eligible American channels, usually articulated as obiter dicta in a
decision directed at licensing Canadian services, evolved over time from requiring delisting of the
American channel, if a like Canadian channel were licensed, to delisting only if requested by a newly
licensed Canadian channel. CMT which had been delivered on Canadian cable companies for ten years
was the first American service to be removed from the eligibility list because of the request of a
Canadian clone. 
After being delisted and finding no solace in the Canadian courts, CMT complained to the office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) which mobilized American governmental resources in its
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  A split-run is an edition of a magazine which uses the same editorial content as another edition of the6
same magazine but includes different advertising content. Thus a magazine publisher can customize its publications
for different regional markets. For a history of this dispute see Litvak and Maule (1974).
 Bill C-103 amending the Excise Tax Act became law on December 15, 1995. Ironically Time was exempted7
from the tax. A”loophole” in Canada’s investment constraints in the cultural industries was also closed as a result of
the Sports Illustrated initiative. The “Related business guidelines” of the Investment Canada Act were changed to
require permission for any investment by a foreign concern to publish a magazine in Canada regardless of whether or
not it already published another magazine in Canada. Sports Illustrated was not exempted from the excise tax but was
from the change in the investment guidelines. 
6
support. The case was not channeled through the formal dispute resolution process of either the
NAFTA or the WTO but through informal bilateral political channels, where as the larger trading
partner the United States had more levers to obtain a favorable outcome. We speculate that the
USTR’s office did not want to test NAFTA, because of uncertainty about the circumstances under
which retaliation is permitted. Nor did it want to try the resolution mechanism of the then new WTO,
because the CMT case involved a service, the legal status of the plaintiff’s rights in Canada were
unclear, and there was limited benefit from setting a precedent for dealings with other countries. 
This case illustrates that the exemption of culture from a trade agreement, when effective, does not
mean that disputes do not occur, but rather that they are handled in a negotiating arena governed by
informal rules in which the smaller country often tends to be in the weaker position. It also reveals that
culture or any interdependent matter of value is always on the diplomatic table, and the meal on the
bilateral table may be less appetizing than on the multilateral one. 
Most cultural activities involve both trade in goods and services. Since the CMT case involved trade in
a television signal, the goods component of the service was small or non-existent. The trade agreements
were more likely to play a role in a dispute involving an activity in which a good was clearly involved in
the delivery of content. A dispute involving Canadian policies toward foreign magazines had this
characteristic and resulted in the USTR initiating a WTO complaint.
For over 40 years, Canada has developed an array of policies to assist domestic periodical publishers.
Measures have focused on diverting advertising revenues to Canadian and away from foreign, primarily
American, publishers. In the 1960s and 1970s, split-run Canadian editions of Time and Reader’s
Digest were the issue.  In the 1990s, the dispute was reignited by the decision of Time’s parent6
company, Time Warner to publish a split-run edition of Sports Illustrated with the common content
delivered to Canada by satellite. To prevent this and to discourage others from expanding into Canada
by this route, the original policies were reinforced with measures designed to cope with new
technologies and international agreements. One element in this reformulation was a prohibitive 80
percent excise tax on advertising revenue in split-run or regional editions of magazines.  The USTR7
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 At the time the dispute occurred, the following policies were aimed at assisting Canadian periodicals:8
- a tariff item which prevented the importation of copies of split-run editions into Canada,
- an 80 percent excise tax on advertising contained in split-run editions (this applied to Canadian-owned and foreign-
owned split-runs),
- a postal subsidy arrangement which permitted lower postal rates for Canadian than foreign periodicals
- a provision of the Income Tax Act which disallowed for income tax purposes the deductibility of advertising
expenditures placed in split-run editions of magazines.
All but the last measure was claimed by the United States to be in contravention of Canada’s WTO
obligations since they restricted the sale of foreign periodicals in Canada. This case illustrates a number of the
emerging issues that will have to be addressed in the handling of culture in trade disputes and in future trade
negotiations.
  More generally, the issue is that where a policy measure is applied to a service but also affects a tradeable9
good will provisions of the GATT or GATS apply. Thus if a country places a special tax on restaurant meals using
imported foods or a tax on the lease of foreign cars would this be handled as a measure affecting a good or a service. 
7
complaint maintained that a prohibitive tariff item which had been part of the earlier response to the
Time/Reader’s Digest dispute, the excise tax and a set of postal subsidies for Canadian magazines were
inconsistent with Canada’s WTO obligations.8
Canada argued that the excise tax on advertising was a tax on advertising services rather than a tax on
goods (periodicals). Since it had made no commitments for cultural services under the GATS, it was
viewed as an allowable tax. The United States contended that the excise tax affected the sale of a good
and therefore Canada could not use the provisions of the GATS to exempt this measure. The dispute
panel agreed that both a tradeable good and service were involved so that provisions of both the
GATT and the GATS were applicable, but that one agreement did not take  precedence over the
other. Since trade in periodical goods was adversely affected by the tax on advertising services, the tax
was contrary to Canada’s obligations under the WTO (World Trade Organization 1997a, 1997b). The
protection offered by the GATS for the protectionist cultural policies of WTO members appears to
have been weakened by this decision.9
The decision also reveals that for trade in cultural goods the provisions of the GATT have applied since
1947. Published material such as newspapers, periodicals and books in hard copy formats are all
goods. Films, television programs and sound recordings can be traded in tangible and intangible forms.
Will they be considered as goods in one case and services in the other? If so, for the countries with
protective policies, the most economical form may be bypassed in search of a form that lies outside the
domain of the WTO rules. These boundary problems and the perverse incentives created by them are
multiplying as different regimes cover interrelated areas of international commerce, as some sectors are
carved out of the agreements altogether and still others receive special treatment. Another example
affecting the cultural industries is the less than bright line dividing trade in services generated by
intellectual property rights and investment in or exchanges in ownership of those rights. An analogy is
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 Canada with a population of 30 million, of which about 22 million is English-speaking, is approximately10
one-tenth the size of the United States. This suggests limited opportunities for licensed Canadian services with
about 1.3% of the English-speaking Canadian population already hooked up to grey market dishes compared with
2% of the United States population linked to licensed dishes.
 Shaw's interest in Star Choice will amount to between 49.3% and 60.9% of the voting shares, depending11
on the number of outstanding warrants and options that are exercised by other shareholders. Control resides with
the service's board of directors, with Shaw having the ability to nominate 50% of its members. See CRTC Decision
97-677, Ottawa, 22 December 1997.
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the impact on tenancy arrangements domestically if national tax and legal regimes treated a long-term
lease of a building with an option to renew very differently than owning the building.
Another issue revealing the difficulties of dealing with the promise of new technologies within a
protectionist framework is the Canadian response to the arrival of the new era of direct broadcasting
satellites. Since the inception of service to American customers by DirecTv and USSB in 1994 and the
launch of other American services, Canada has concentrated on clarifying its legal right to block the
marketing of American direct-to-home (DTH) broadcasters in Canada. The weight of Canadian court
opinion has shifted as cases were decided in different jurisdictions. It now appears that both the sale or
ownership of equipment designed to receive an unauthorized encrypted broadcasting signal are illegal,
although the legal dance may not yet be over. In the interim, the American small antenna services are
estimated to have gained some 300,000 grey market Canadian subscribers. Measured against the 5.8
million estimated American subscribers to these services and taking account of the regulatory and legal
environment in which this subscriber base was developed, this penetration is an impressive testimony to
their popularity.  10
After the legal tide turned in their favor, the Canadian parties pressing the civil cases have announced an
intention to sue commercial subscribers such as taverns as well as the suppliers of equipment and
services. They are unlikely to sue individual non-commercial grey market subscribers. Some level of
grey market activity will persist with equipment bought in the United States.
More than two years after the launch of the American services, two licensed Canadian services--
ExpressVu, majority-owned and controlled by Bell Canada Enterprises and Star Choice--a vehicle of
Shaw Communications Ltd., a large Canadian cable company have begun to deliver Canadian
alternatives.  The Canadian services face a formidable marketing challenge, because they do not offer11
as diverse a set of viewing alternatives as their American counterparts and because of the overhang of
the grey market subscribers. The latter is being addressed at considerable cost by offering grey market
subscribers both “amnesty” and special deals when they turn in the hardware from a US service. The
Toronto Globe and Mail (Dec 17, 1997, B7) recently reported: 
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When someone buys a $599 ExpressVu dish and box, they get $599 worth of free programming
when they hand over the U.S. product. For ExpressVu’s higher-end $749 receiver, they get $749 of
free programming in exchange for the DirecTV or EchoStar dish.” 
 The American DTH services have a larger channel capacity than the typical cable system. In competing
with American cable systems, they have been surprisingly successful in marketing
pay-per-view (ppv) movie and sports packages. The Canadian companies cannot match these services
in the short run because they do not have the rights and in the long run unless they are allowed to show
plenty of foreign content. The latter problem may be masked, as it has in the
past, by defining a very wide array of sports activities as Canadian.
The Canadian market is substantially smaller than that of the United States and has the added
characteristic of greater linguistic diversity. It is unlikely to support one, let alone two, Canadian DTH
broadcasters handicapped by a protectionist regulatory policy. From an economic perspective, the
technology of satellite broadcasting creates an imperative for continentally integrated delivery of diverse
services. Working out such an arrangement requires a new conceptual framework. In its absence
Canada may end up with a stubbornly large grey market and two economically marginal domestic
services. 
The absence of disputes involving newspapers illustrates inconsistencies that apply between media.
Promotion of the use of Canadian content is undertaken via Cancon rules for television and radio.
Similar policies do not apply to publishing. There are no requirements that Canadian libraries and
bookstores carry a certain amount of Canadian content or that Canadian book, periodical and
newspaper publishers carry a certain percentage of Canadian content even though these may be an
important way in which Canadians talk to other Canadians. There are provisions in the income tax act
that encourage Canadian advertisers to advertise in Canadian owned magazines. To the extent that
these publications are more likely to carry Canadian content, whatever that is, then these policies may
have some effects similar to Cancon rules for broadcasting. 
What is noteworthy in newspaper publishing is that the non-advertising content is often made up of
stories acquired from foreign wire services and foreign newspapers. The business section of the Globe
and Mail contains a daily page from the Wall Street Journal as well as articles from Bloomberg
Business service and financial news from foreign sources. At year end, the Globe’s Report on Business
produced a joint publication with the Economist (The World in 1998) carrying advertising aimed at the
Canadian market. This publication uses a split-run format (it publishes in 12 languages and 80
countries) which is disallowed in the case of other foreign publications. The content policy towards the
print media tends to deviate from the same policy applied to broadcasting. This inconsistency is seldom
noted in discussions of cultural policy but is at odds with the view that Canadian content is necessary to
promote unity and identity.
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Technology was an issue in the periodical case since Sports Illustrated transmitted its editorial content
electronically to Canada in a manner that evaded the tariff  provision which blocked the transmission of
physical copies of publications into Canada. A more pervasive force is the operation of the Internet
which provides a means of communication for any content that can be converted to an analogue or
digital signal. Newspapers and periodicals are available for downloading from the Internet. Experiments
are being undertaken with real audio and web TV as well as use of the net for telephone conversations.
None of these services or use of the Internet coincides with national boundaries or the regulations that
can be applied to entities within those boundaries. Consequently the protective walls of domestic
policies are being invaded by the onslaught of technology as well as the frictions between domestic
policies and international agreements which successive Canadian governments have entered into. These
invasive forces are also evident in the way existing policies have been modified
Managed foreign entry, grandfathering and the bounded ability to regulate
A persistent aspect of Canadian cultural policy has been the unpublicized concession to viewer
preference through granting selectively and partially access to foreign media (Acheson and Maule,
1996). Historically, this policy is reflected in granting the traditional American networks implicit tenure
on the basic tier of Canadian cable when cable was being established in Canada. Later, the eligibility
lists, discussed above, designated some American cable networks as fit for Canadian consumption.
Those excluded were presumably not fit. A more ironical  manifestation of the strategy of discriminatory
treatment among foreign firms occurs in the magazine industry in which Reader’s Digest has become the
“Canadian” magazine with the largest national circulation. Grandfathering at the time of a policy change
has a similar discriminating effect to arbitrarily deciding that some foreign concern is really Canadian.
For example, the Hollywood studios were exempted from the effects of a 1988 Investment Canada
directive denying foreign firms the right to distribute films in Canada unless they had proprietary rights to
the film. This grandfathering was granted despite the fact that the new directive was implemented in
response to investigations commissioned by the government, which were critical of those distribution
companies. 
From the perspective of Canadian policy makers, allowing selective entry has a strategic advantage in
that it divides the foreign interests. By granting some foreign players entry and denying it to others, the
chosen not only gain access but freedom from competition by the excluded firms in the Canadian
market. The chosen firms are unlikely to join the excluded in rallying their home governments to
pressure the Canadian government to change its policies. Through this policy, the Canadian government
not only offers some relief to consumers but also gains lobbying allies in foreign capitals.
A downside of this strategy for the policy maker is the continued opposition of the excluded and the
tension created among domestic players who face some increased competition from those allowed to
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 This statement was attributed to the Minister of Heritage Canada, Sheila Copps, in a story appearing in12
the Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1997 D1, D12.
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provide the service in Canada. Another negative is the dissonance between the complex reality of
cultural policies and the simple mantra of “creating a public space for Canadian voices to tell Canadian
stories” through which those policies are justified to consumers and voters. A third problem is the
difficulty of managing this intricate political process, particularly in a period of rapid technological and
organizational change. 
Our thesis is that the negatives are becoming a more important factor. The CRTC’s 3 + 1 broadcasting
policy, for example, was originally formulated in response to the popularity of American stations
received in border towns and cities in the late 1970s. By the 1990s, the Fox Network sprang from
nowhere to challenge the incumbent trio of commercial networks. Fox has been particularly successful
with younger American viewers. Adding to the pressure on the Canadian regulator to include Fox with
the other three was the fact that Fox shoots segments of its popular show, the X-Files, in Vancouver
and one of its stars lived for a time in the city. In 1994, the policy was changed to allow on the basic
tier:
any three of the four conventional commercial U.S. network services in addition to the
non-commercial PBS network service, and allowing the distribution, on either an encrypted or
unencrypted discretionary tier, of a fourth conventional commercial U.S. network service, subject
to the Commission's existing linkage rules in relation to the distribution of Canadian specialty and
pay television services (CRTC Public Notice 1994-107).
Of the five networks, PBS is now the only one assured of being carried on the basic tier. It receives
about two per cent of the viewership which is about one-sixth of the viewership of the Canadian English
language public broadcaster, the CBC. The emerging contradictions of Canadian cultural policy are
well illustrated by trying to disentangle the logic of a policy that has the following characteristics. It is
designed, according to the Minister of Canadian Heritage, to counter U.S. “domination of the world
culture community.”  A decline in both viewership and budgetary support of the Canadian public12
television network has mobilized a number of nationalist groups to rally to the defense of the CBC. The
regulator which sympathizes publicly with the nationalist groups assures the American public network,
presumably a close competitor of CBC, a position on the basic tier of every major Canadian cable
system while delisting an American country and western channel so as to protect a new Canadian
clone. 
As an aftermath of the CMT dispute, the CRTC announced a change in its policy with respect to the
status of American channels on its eligibility lists and declared that 
...it will not be disposed to remove a non-Canadian service from the lists, even should it license, in
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  The circumstances surrounding this case are responsible for the wording in Article 2005(1) of the13
CUSFTA regarding receipt of fair market value for the forced divestiture of assets in Canada.
 A further issue that is inherent in grandfathering arrangements is the pressure to make the grandfathering14
transferable. The Globe and Mail’s telecommunications reporter has recently noted:
BC Tel’s current owner, Stamford, Conn.-based GTE Corp., is courting the sale of its local phone
companies and is widely rumored to be in talks with AT&T (Jan. 3, 1998 B1, B3).
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the future, a Canadian service in a competitive format (CRTC Public Notice 1997-96, July 22, 1997).
The Commission has also significantly increased the number of American services on the eligibility lists. 
In the print media, the “Baie Comeau” policy of 1985 which was intended to place the control of
publishing in Canada in Canadian hands was amended in 1992 and now permits foreign ownership of
Canadian book publishing and distribution in certain circumstances. The amendment came about after
the Canadian government was unable to find Canadian investors for the Ginn Canadian Publishing
Company which had become owned by the Paramount Corporation.   13
B.C. Telephone and Quebec Telephone are two Canadian telephone service providers that are owned
and controlled by an American firm, GTE, through a Canadian holding company. This arrangement,
which is not in compliance with the foreign ownership regulations for telecommunication firms, is
permitted as a result of a grandfathering arrangement. Recently, the government was asked to extend
their exemption from foreign ownership restrictions to also cover their cable activities. It complied. As a
result of technological convergence, the Canadian telephone companies are expected to be a significant
source of competition to the cable franchisees and vice versa in the new, more open, Canadian
regulatory structures for broadcasting and telecommunications, although to date little actual competition
has materialized. 
Since the decision to extend the exemption, Rogers Communications, which owns large cable systems
in British Columbia, has filed a lawsuit challenging the federal Cabinet’s authority to exempt these
companies. Without the companies receiving the cable exemption, the affected cable subscribers will
not be able to buy cable services from their current local telephone company. With it, the cable
companies serving these areas will face competition from a foreign-owned concern while its
counterparts in other areas of Canada will only face competition from firms with more limited access to
foreign capital. In either case, an inadvertent discrimination emerges which has its roots in the Canadian
policy of preferential treatment among foreign suppliers.  14
The grandfathering provisions for the Hollywood majors has generated a dispute from an unexpected
direction. Polygram, a large well financed European firm has been expanding its international production
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a Canadian firm, Alliance Communications Corp. from distributing films in the province because it does not have a
major presence there. This means that a Canadian distributor is receiving less favorable treatment than the American
major film distributors. See Globe and Mail, Jan.8, 1997, B1.
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and distribution capabilities in a number of media. In film distribution, it has sought the same status
within Canada as the Hollywood firms have. This request has been turned down and the European
Union (EU) has lodged a formal complaint with the WTO on this matter. The irony is that the Canadian
government has publicly declared that it is looking for allies in Europe to ensure the exemption of culture
from future trade and investment negotiations as a defense against American cultural imperialism. The
ultimate incidence of the grandfathering is difficult to assess. As multinationals today live up to their
names, in many instances, it is difficult to associate them with particular countries. To the extent that one
can do that with the grandfathered firms, the current policy benefits studios owned and controlled by a
Japanese firm, Sony, an Australian firm, News Corp., a Canadian firm, Seagrams, and an American
firm, Time Warner. Polygram may well wonder what cultural benefit is derived from keeping an Anglo-
Dutch firm on the outside of this group.15
In the 1960s grandfathering arrangements were used to exempt Time and Reader’s Digest from certain
restrictive Canadian policies. Reader’s Digest remains a beneficiary of these arrangements today.
Time’s original grandfathering was removed, but its status has also grown more secure, more
“Canadian,” over time as is evidenced by its being grandfathered in the excise tax legislation. 
In book distribution, restrictions on foreign ownership have lead to a policy that barred entry for
Borders Books but permitted entry for Barnes and Noble into book retailing in Canada. The policy of
determining when minority foreign investment constitutes control by the minority investor is responsible
for the differential treatment of these two American firms, a policy that requires administrative discretion
in making fine distinctions about when and how control is exercised. 
A step towards abandoning discretionary and discriminating elements with respect to investment, as is
illustrated in the foregoing examples, is to negotiate an international agreement based on the mutual
exchange of non-discriminatory access. As the following section makes clear, including culture in such a
framework will be a formidable challenge.
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
The twenty-nine member countries of the OECD are currently negotiating an international agreement on
investment that will parallel in many ways the provisions of the WTO regarding trade in goods and
services. Although at present there is only draft wording, the negotiations are scheduled to conclude in
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  Details of the background to the MAI and the representations made by Canadian interest groups in16
hearings before a parliamentary committee can be found in “Canada and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,”
First Report of the Sub-Committee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investment, House of Commons,
Ottawa, December 1997.
 See OECD, Introduction of an Exception Clause for Cultural Industries in the MAI,17
DAFFE/MAI/RD(96)26, OLIS 25 April 1996.
  There are likely to be two types of reservations permitted, bound and unbound reservations. A bound18
reservation is one where a country agrees to “standstill” such that it will not amend the measure in a way that is
more restrictive but it can be made less restrictive. In future rounds of negotiations, bound reservations are likely to
be the subject of  “rollback” or amendments that make the measure less restrictive. An unbound reservation is one
that a country makes no commitment either to “standstill” or “rollback.”
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the Spring of 1998. The principle provisions of the MAI are for non-discrimination through most-
favored-nation and national treatment principles for international investment, and for measures to
protect property in the event of expropriation and compensation. Similar to the GATS provisions of the
WTO, and the NAFTA, the MAI will contain means for countries to reserve particular industries or
activities from the obligations of the agreement. Protecting the cultural industries is one area that is of
interest to the governments of Canada, France, Australia and other countries.  16
At present, France has proposed the following wording:17
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting Party to take
any measure to regulate investment of foreign companies and the conditions of activity
of these companies, in the framework of policies designed to preserve and promote
cultural and linguistic diversity.
The aim of this wording is to exempt culture from all the obligations of the agreement. As of January
1998, Canada supports the French approach but has indicated that if a general exemption is not
achieved, it will take a country specific reservation for culture. In a legal sense the two approaches are
the same. Politically they differ. An exemption would apply to all 29 countries. A country specific
reservation would be identifiable to Canada as well as to those countries that listed a reservation for
culture. In future rounds of negotiations, even if it was an unbound reservation, there could be some
political pressure for Canada to change its position on culture in return for something Canada wanted.18
This would be less likely to occur if there was a general exemption for culture.
Other aspects of the French approach are of interest. Culture is defined in terms of “cultural and
linguistic diversity.” This is seen by some to be a broad self-defining view of culture, but for others it is
limiting because of its reference to cultural and linguistic diversity. Promoting the diversity of cultures
might be more self-defining wording. We note these semantic issues since ultimately it becomes the
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  The original wording submitted by SOCAN for a cultural exemption to the MAI was presented in19
SOCAN’s brief to the Standing Committee studying the MAI on November 20, 1997. The revised wording was
contained in a letter sent by Keith Kelly, National Director of the Canadian Conference of the Arts to Minister
Marchi, dated December 12, 1997.
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interpretation of words that will be important in resolving disputes.
Another definitional matter relates to investment. The proposed wording in the MAI is broader than that
contained in the Investment Chapter (11) of NAFTA. Canada has argued that it wants to replicate the
investment provisions of the NAFTA in the MAI. If the definition is broader in the MAI, the two
agreements will differ in an important respect. Does this matter for culture? It may, especially with
regards to the inclusion of intellectual property as investment in the MAI. If it is treated differently in the
two agreements then for investment disputes between Canada and the United States a decision will
have to be made as to which agreement takes precedence.
The treatment of intellectual property raises another issue. Commercial transactions involving films and
television programs involve the financing of programs by way of equity investment and presale of
distribution rights. The former is investment in intellectual property, while the latter involves a financial
transaction for a tradeable service, the distribution rights. If there is a dispute over intellectual property it
may be possible to deal with it under an investment agreement or a trade agreement providing the
parties with the opportunity to forum shop. In general, as the number of agreements proliferate and the
boundaries between them overlap, uncertainty is created for investors and governments.
A Canadian group representing music composers and publishers (SOCAN) has proposed alternative
wording for defining culture in a MAI exception. The preamble is as follows:19
Cultural sovereignty means that a nation has the right to define and defend what it means by
culture, which, broadly understood, encompasses the intellectual and creative side of
civilization.
For Canadians, culture includes:
- the nurturing of creativity and artistic excellence
- the preservation of heritage
- the accessibility of all citizens to a nation’s traditions, creative content and expressions of
identity
A nation has the right to develop and implement public institutions and policy instruments at all
levels of government in order to assure the continued creation, preservation, promotion and
accessibility of culture to all its citizens.
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 See http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/multilateral.html/21
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The proposal then goes on to use the general approach of  NAFTA to the definition of cultural
industries with one important difference. The definition includes the words “communication by
telecommunication” in connection with each cultural subsector The purpose is, in the words of
SOCAN, to make the definition technologically neutral. What it does is to permit transmissions over the
Internet to be considered part of the cultural industries and therefore subject to both domestic
broadcasting-type policies as well as a cultural exemption. In contrast, those providing Internet
services, telecommunication, cable and computer companies are lobbying to prevent the Internet from
being regulated under broadcasting regimes which would limit the material that could be carried due to
content regulations. How culture becomes ultimately defined in the MAI is important for these activities
regardless of whether a general exception or a country-specific reservation is negotiated.
Another aspect of the MAI relates to taxation which is carved out of the proposed agreement except as
it relates to expropriation by taxation. This means that while a country will be able to offer subsidies
providing they respect national treatment, no similar constraints are placed on tax incentives as they
apply to investment. This provides a gaping loophole in the treaty, supported by departments of finance
everywhere which do not appreciate interference in tax matters by other government departments.   In20
future rounds of negotiations on the MAI, some remedies could be introduced. If the present wording is
sustained, countries will be free to assist the cultural industries through tax incentives that affect
investments. We believe that the subsidy issue should be addressed in an international forum to focus on
the legitimate role of subsidies for cultural purposes as compared to their mutually destructive use as
beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
The American response to the French proposal has been to state its objection to a broad cultural
exception from the obligations of the MAI, and its preference that countries propose specific
exceptions if they wish to protect their cultural industries. Should this occur, some of the same
uncertainties that have arisen from the treatment of culture in trade agreements will reappear in an
investment agreement.21
The Image and the Reality
Industry lobbyists in support of Canada’s cultural policies have to date retained a united front in
representations to government. They argued for a strong stance in the MAI negotiations to ensure that
culture is exempted from the obligations of the agreement. For them failure to get the necessary
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 In Committee hearings on November 26, 1997, Members were asked if they wanted to hear from experts22
whose views are that “...Canada really doesn’t need to protect its culture...and that we shouldn’t be setting up
obstacles to counter the globalization of trade....We should not be attempting to thwart this trend through cultural
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protection should be a deal breaker for Canada regardless of the benefits to other industry groups. In
parallel hearings before the parliamentary Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, the same interest
groups have aggressively argued their case before a group of sympathetic Members of Parliament who
have recorded their lack of interest in hearing from persons who might present alternative views on the
appropriateness of Canadian policies.   22
The continuing strength of the cultural lobby, similar to that of farmers’ support for agricultural
protection is worthy of note. Both groups argue the uniqueness of their industries as justification for
support as do other industries such as pharmaceuticals and petroleum. Unfortunately if each is unique,
this trait loses its value in persuading governments to retain protectionist measures. As a character in
T.S.Eliot’s Cocktail Party remarked, “All cases are unique, and very similar to others.”
Why then has culture been so successful in sustaining protectionist policies and can this position be
maintained? Governments of all political stripes, democratically elected and other are always sensitive
to the media and related cultural interest groups. This is because of the importance of ideas and
opinions in the political process. Concern with the media is tied to the fact that, while producing another
model of car or flavor of popcorn will not shatter a government’s support at the polls, a new idea or
criticism transmitted by the media can. Thus authors, playwrights, singers, film directors and publishers
can act in a way that can be deeply disturbing to governments and affect their chances of reelection in a
way that producers of automobiles and popcorn cannot. Governments react in a number of ways.
Censorship is a time-honored way of trying to prevent the spread of unwanted views, as the Chinese
government is attempting to do today by controlling use of the Internet. Provision of government
subsidies is another technique. If, by handing out money, the authorities can condition what is about to
be produced there is less need to censor what has been produced.
In Canada, the political sensitivity of the cultural industries is reflected in the numerous official inquiries
and policy instruments noted above, as well as in concern expressed over the control exercised by
different levels of government on education, one of the most cultural of industries to which the cultural
lobbyists pay little attention.
One stated rationale for Canadian policies is that Canadian programs should be made by Canadians for
Canadian audiences as though there were stories that would be of interest only to Canadians. This
condemns Canadian productions to the small linguistically divided domestic market and necessitates the
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provision of subsidies. We can think of few stories that are of interest only to Canadians and contend
that it is counterproductive to encourage our creative talent to target such narrow markets. In late 1997,
two Canadian films, The Sweet Hereafter and The Hanging Garden are drawing well in Canadian
cinemas. Both feature stories set in Canada. Both have received international recognition and will sell
well abroad. These films follow two obviously British films The Full Monty and Bean into the cinemas
which are also experiencing impressive international box-office success. 
Despite the strength of the cultural lobby, there are signs of change brought about not only by
technology and the friction between domestic and international policies, but by the economic
imperatives of these industries. Increasingly there are examples of Canadian firms that are successfully
penetrating foreign markets, and of commercial producers recognizing that opportunities exist in the
wider market. A comment by a Canadian producer is revealing in this regard. In planning the
production of a TV mini-series on the history of the Hudson Bay Company based on a book by
Canadian author Peter Newman, entertainment lawyer Michael Levine commented:
Now, we could take it and we could plant the entire story in Montreal and on Hudson’s
Bay and in Winnipeg, and we could tell it from a Canadian viewpoint in a way that I
could guarantee that absolutely nobody would have bought it. But the Hudson’s Bay
story - that’s a Canadian story ...that has universal appeal. The way to do it is to focus
on the Orkneys and the Scots and the money men in London and the British Royal
Family, so you see it is an international story (Globe and Mail, January 25, 1997, C1).
Evidence that an outward approach is the preferred strategy is found in the annual reports of Canadian
production companies:
“...our goal to build a Canadian-based filmed entertainment company with a global platform.”
(Alliance Annual Report, 1996, 2).
“Atlantis is significantly an export company. In 1995, approximately 86% of our program license fee
came from outside Canada.” (Atlantis Annual Report, 1995, 5).
The relative importance of revenues from international sales, sales in Canada and subsidies shown in
Chart 1 is derived from the annual reports of Cinar for the period 1991 to 1996. By 1996, revenues
from international sales were more important than those from Canadian sales and Canadian subsidies
combined. If the choice is between retaining protectionist policies as represented by subsidies and
access to international markets as represented by international sales, then for Cinar the choice is clearly
for the latter.
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Chart 1
Another aspect of the importance of foreign markets for the Canadian industry is the use made by
foreign firms of Canadian locations for offshore shooting. The California Entertainment Industry
Development Corporation (CEIDC) estimates that Canada has lured about US$1 Billion of business
from the United States, US$507 million to Toronto and US$537 million to British Columbia. This is
small compared to the US$20 billion brought in by Los Angeles but compares to New York $2.2
billion, Florida $414 million, North Carolina $391 million and Chicago $101 million.  By building a23
strong industry base in Canada, opportunities and financing will be created for products that have a
more Canadian focus.
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Evidence that an imperfectly structured subsidy system for the support of cultural industries may actually
be harmful to their development can be found in European experience. In 1960, annual cinema
admissions of what is now the European Union was 3 billion compared to 1.2 billion in the United
States. By 1995, the figures were 0.7 billion for Europe and 1.2 billion in the United States. Within
Europe  “American films have maintained a constant box office in Europe ($2.5 billion in real terms)
since 1960, while box office for European films in the same period has fallen from $4 billion to $0.5
billion (Dale, 1997, 173).” The subsidy system for financing films in Europe is widely attributed even by
those in the industry with the declining commercial success of films made in Europe. Martin Dale notes:
The state now decides the cultural agenda of the nation and appoints the key
commissioning editors whose editorial remits make it very difficult for them to make
popular films.
At best, commissioners are excellent film professionals who do their best to make good
films within the limits that have been placed on them. At worst, commissioning is the
result of bribery and corruption and the films that are made are mediocre (Dale, 1997,
183).
Mike Figgis, a British director, commented more directly on the financing system in the U.K.:
It’s so inundated with class and snobbery and nepotism that all the talent that is waiting
there to be used, waiting to be involved, waiting to be creative - and I have no doubt
that it is there, it’s there in spades - is not welcome, is not brought in. No one’s really
looking for new talent, real new talent, they just hop off to Cambridge or Oxford and
find some bright young thing who might make a film or two because it’s a fairly
interesting thing to do. It’s fucked up. It’s the problem of Britain [and it won’t change]
until they can separate talent from class, which I have to say in America they can - they
really do not give a toss unless you can make a film which a) will sell and b) will be
interesting, and they’re often the same thing (Quoted in Dale, 1997, 117).
The European Commission set up an audiovisual Think-tank which reported in 1994 on the Audiovisual
Policy in the European Union. It concluded that the financing system used in Europe had been in large
part responsible for the commercial failure of European product. Amongst others, it noted a study by
Hans Gerd Prodehl on film-making policy in Germany. Prodehl’s study of the woes of the German
cinema is “a merciless analysis of the atomization of aid systems in his country through the policies of the
Lander and the catastrophic results on the situation of the film industry in Germany (European
Communities, 1994, 22).”
In Europe there is now recognition that government directed financing of films and television programs
tends to produce a type of product that does not have the commercial appeal of American productions.
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Canadian policy is still based on the view that subsidies and protection are necessary to promote the
industry in Canada even though this has not worked to date in that the industry still clamors for
subsidies and the preservation of measures like Canadian content rules for television and the banning of
split-run editions of magazines. The lessons from the European experience are not that subsidies should
not be used but that, if their rationale is cultural, careful thought be put into their design. Otherwise the
cultural argument depreciates in value and becomes a Trojan horse for an industrial policy which would
not receive approval in any other sector.    
Conclusion
Our take on Canada's cultural policies is that there remains strong political and industry support for the
existing policies, but that there are signs of change brought about by altered economic imperatives for at
least some sectors of the cultural industries and a growing reluctance of
other countries to permit access without reciprocity.
Attempts to insulate the cultural industries from the liberalizing commitments accepted in other industries
have not succeeded. The United States has successfully pursued its cultural interests in disputes with
Canada within existing international agreements and through informal bilateral channels. The Canadian
policy of selective and discriminatory granting of access creates disparities of treatment among
American interests and between those American companies, which have received access, and similar
companies from other countries. These disparities are a breeding ground for trade disputes. Similar
challenges will arise if a MAI is negotiated and culture is exempted from the obligations of the
agreement.
Although the new technologies have broadened the market for the content of all the cultural industries,
some sectors have been affected more than others. As a result, the calculus of whether the sector will
gain more from a policy of openness or protection varies across sectors. In an earlier period of
development, all of the sectors were probably net beneficiaries of protection. We predict that the
unanimous support for protection will disappear if a hard choice is faced between reducing protection
at home and maintaining access to foreign markets.
The domestic and international success of Canadians such as recording artists Celine Dion, Alanis
Morissette, and Bryan Adams, directors Atom Egoyan, James Cameron and Norman Jewison, authors
Margaret Atwood, Mavis Gallant, Mordechai Richler and Timothy Findlay and programs such as Due
South and DeGrassi High are a testimony to the emerging Canadian professional, technical and business
creativity in the cultural industries. In less high profile but equally important fields are composers such as
Howard Shore whose work includes the musical scores for Philadelphia and eight Cronenberg films.
Similar international successes are increasingly common, albeit less visible, in niche music, television and
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film markets.
Songs and stories that are popular in Canada travel well to other countries - Anne of Green Gables is a
continuing hit with Japanese audiences. The spinners of television stories and makers of films are also
traveling to Canada. The depth of professional and technical talent, the sophistication of film and
television production and post-production facilities and the favorable exchange rate are attracting many
foreign productions to locate in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.
In every area of the Canadian cultural industries, there are not only creative personnel but new and
innovative organizations. To sustain that success a similar creativity needs to be exercised with respect
to designing domestic cultural policies and international arrangements appropriate to a small country.
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